What transparency can do when incentives fail an analysis of rent capture /
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Ngā kaituhi rangatōpū: | , |
| Ētahi atu kaituhi: | |
| Hōputu: | Tāhiko īPukapuka |
| Reo: | Ingarihi |
| I whakaputaina: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept.,
c2006.
|
| Rangatū: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/146. |
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
|
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