What transparency can do when incentives fail an analysis of rent capture /

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Bibliografski detalji
Glavni autor:	Dabla-Norris, Era
Autori kompanije:	International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept, ebrary, Inc
Daljnji autori:	Paul, Elisabeth
Format:	Elektronički e-knjiga
Jezik:	engleski
Izdano:	Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept., c2006.
Serija:	IMF working paper ; WP/06/146.
Teme:	Corruption > Developing countries > Prevention > Econometric models. Rent (Economic theory) > Econometric models. Transparency in government > Econometric models. Electronic books.
Online pristup:	An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view
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