Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Corporate Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
| Series: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
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