Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
Tallennettuna:
| Päätekijä: | |
|---|---|
| Yhteisötekijä: | |
| Aineistotyyppi: | Elektroninen E-kirja |
| Kieli: | englanti |
| Julkaistu: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
| Sarja: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
| Aiheet: | |
| Linkit: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Tagit: |
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