Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
Zapisane w:
| 1. autor: | |
|---|---|
| Korporacja: | |
| Format: | Elektroniczne E-book |
| Język: | angielski |
| Wydane: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
| Seria: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Etykiety: |
Nie ma etykietki, Dołącz pierwszą etykiete!
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