Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
Gardado en:
| Autor Principal: | |
|---|---|
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
| Series: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
| Subjects: | |
| Acceso en liña: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Tags: |
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