Crowe, C. (2006). Goal-independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate. International Monetary Fund.
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Chicago Style (17th ed.) Zitazioa
Crowe, Christopher. Goal-independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate. [Washington, D.C.]: International Monetary Fund, 2006.
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MLA (9th ed.) Zitazioa
Crowe, Christopher. Goal-independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate. International Monetary Fund, 2006.
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