Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Körperschaft: | |
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Tags: |
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie das erste Tag hinzu!
|
Ähnliche Einträge: Goal-independent central banks
- Central bank independence and transparency : evolution and effectiveness /
- Central bank boards around the world why does membership size differ? /
- Banking on reform political parties and central bank independence in the industrial democracies /
- Central Banks as economic Institutions Thursday, november 30,2006.
- Banking on the future the fall and rise of central banking /
- The changing face of central banking evolutionary trends since World War II /