Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Kaituhi rangatōpū: | |
| Hōputu: | Tāhiko īPukapuka |
| Reo: | Ingarihi |
| I whakaputaina: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
| Rangatū: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
|
Ngā tūemi rite: Goal-independent central banks
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