Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
Guardat en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Autor corporatiu: | |
| Format: | Electrònic eBook |
| Idioma: | anglès |
| Publicat: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
| Col·lecció: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Etiquetes: |
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