APA (7 वां संस्करण) प्रशस्ति पत्र
Crowe, C. (2006). Goal-independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate. International Monetary Fund.
शिकागो शैली (17वां संस्करण) प्रशस्ति पत्र
Crowe, Christopher. Goal-independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate. [Washington, D.C.]: International Monetary Fund, 2006.
एमएलए (9वां संस्करण) प्रशस्ति पत्र
Crowe, Christopher. Goal-independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate. International Monetary Fund, 2006.
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