Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
"This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international securi...
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| Format: | Électronique eBook |
| Langue: | anglais |
| Publié: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
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Table des matières:
- Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world.