Corruption as a Last Resort : Adapting to the Market in Central Asia /
Why do ordinary people engage in corruption? Kelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and form...
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Ithaca :
Cornell University Press,
2014.
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| Series: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
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| 100 | 1 | |a McMann, Kelly M., |d 1970- |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Corruption as a Last Resort : |b Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / |c Kelly M. McMann. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Ithaca : |b Cornell University Press, |c 2014. | |
| 264 | 3 | |a Baltimore, Md. : |b Project MUSE, |c 2015 | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2014. | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (200 pages). | ||
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| 505 | 0 | |a An absence of alternatives : a new framework for understanding corruption -- Alternatives to corruption and the impact of market reform : the arguments and their theoretical implications -- Bribery, favoritism, and clientelism : evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan -- Market actors as an unrealized alternative : the impact of market reforms -- Islamic institutions and secular charities : obstacles to providing substitute resources -- Families : the uneven impact of market reforms -- Reducing corruption : policy recommendations -- Appendix : statistical analysis. | |
| 506 | 0 | |a Open Access |f Unrestricted online access |2 star | |
| 520 | |6 880-01 |a Why do ordinary people engage in corruption? Kelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. Using evidence from her long-term research in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, McMann shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials. A leading cause of this resource scarcity is market reform, as demonstrated by McMann's analysis of these countries as well as of Uzbekistan and global data. Market reform without supporting institutions, such as credit registries and antimonopoly measures, limits the resources available from the market and societal groups. McMann finds that in these circumstances only those individuals who have affluent relatives have an alternative to corruption. By focusing on ordinary people, McMann offers a new understanding of corruption. Previously, our knowledge was largely restricted to government officials' role in illicit exchanges. From her novel approach comes a useful policy insight: supplying ordinary people with alternatives to corruption is a fundamental and important anticorruption strategy. | ||
| 546 | |a In English. | ||
| 588 | |a Description based on print version record. | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Wirtschaftsreform |2 gnd | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Korruption |2 gnd | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Post-communism |x Economic aspects. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01072733 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Politics and government. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01919741 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Political corruption. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01069240 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Economic history. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00901974 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Corruption. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01352550 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Marketing |v General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Sales & Selling |v General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Comparative Politics. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Political Economy. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Sales & Selling |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Marketing |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Commerce. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Society and social sciences Society and social sciences. |2 bicssc | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Politics and government. |2 bicssc | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Political corruption. |2 bicssc | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Postcommunisme |x Aspect economique |z Asie centrale. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Corruption (Politique) |z Asie centrale. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Corruption |z Asie centrale. | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Political corruption |z Asia, Central. | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Post-communism |x Economic aspects |z Asia, Central. | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corruption |z Asia, Central. | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Asia, Central |x Politics and government |x 1991- | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Asia, Central |x Economic conditions |x 1991- | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Post-communism |x Economic aspects |z Asia, Central. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Political corruption |z Asia, Central. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Corruption |z Asia, Central. | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Central Asia. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01240497 | |
| 651 | 6 | |a Asie centrale |x Politique et gouvernement |y 1991- | |
| 651 | 6 | |a Asie centrale |x Conditions economiques |y 1991- | |
| 651 | 0 | |a Asia, Central |x Politics and government |y 1991- | |
| 651 | 0 | |a Asia, Central |x Economic conditions |y 1991- | |
| 655 | 7 | |a Electronic books. |2 local | |
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| 830 | 0 | |a Book collections on Project MUSE. | |
| 880 | |6 520-01/(Q |a Why do ordinary people engage in corruptionKelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. Using evidence from her long-term research in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, McMann shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials. A leading cause of this resource scarcity is market reform, as demonstrated by McMann's analysis of these countries as well as of Uzbekistan and global data. Market reform without supporting institutions, such as credit registries and antimonopoly measures, limits the resources available from the market and societal groups. McMann finds that in these circumstances only those individuals who have affluent relatives have an alternative to corruption. By focusing on ordinary people, McMann offers a new understanding of corruption. Previously, our knowledge was largely restricted to government officialѕђ́ة role in illicit exchanges. From her novel approach comes a useful policy insight: supplying ordinary people with alternatives to corruption is a fundamental and important anticorruption strategy. | ||
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |z Full text available: |u https://muse.jhu.edu/book/42601/ |
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - 2015 History | ||
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - 2015 Complete | ||
| 945 | |a Project MUSE - 2015 Asian and Pacific Studies | ||
| 999 | |c 231708 |d 231707 | ||