Veto Power : Institutional Design in the European Union /

Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiatin...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Slapin, Jonathan B., 1979-
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, [2011]
Series:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Subjects:
Online Access:Full text available:
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100 1 |a Slapin, Jonathan B.,  |d 1979- 
245 1 0 |a Veto Power :   |b Institutional Design in the European Union /   |c Jonathan B. Slapin. 
264 1 |a Ann Arbor :  |b University of Michigan Press,  |c [2011] 
264 3 |a Baltimore, Md. :  |b Project MUSE,   |c 2012 
264 4 |c ©[2011] 
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490 0 |a New comparative politics 
505 0 |a Institutional design at IGCs -- Case selection -- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Winners and losers at Amsterdam -- Council votes and commissioners -- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration -- British accession : exit options and veto power. 
506 0 |a Open Access  |f Unrestricted online access  |2 star 
520 |a Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto--or veto threat--has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration. 
546 |a In English. 
588 |a Description based on print version record. 
610 2 7 |a European Union.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00916630 
610 2 0 |a European Union. 
651 7 |a European Union countries.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01269470 
651 0 |a European Union countries  |x Politics and government. 
650 7 |a Politics and government  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01919741 
650 7 |a Legislative veto.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00995826 
650 7 |a HISTORY  |z Europe  |x General.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a LAW  |x International.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a HISTORY  |z Europe  |v General.  |2 bisacsh 
650 6 |a Veto legislatif  |z Pays de l'Union europeenne. 
650 0 |a Legislative veto  |z European Union countries. 
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856 4 0 |z Full text available:   |u https://muse.jhu.edu/book/10323/ 
945 |a Project MUSE - 2011 Complete 
945 |a Project MUSE - 2011 Political Science and Policy Studies 
999 |c 230802  |d 230801