Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
"This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international securi...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
|---|---|
| مؤلف مشترك: | |
| التنسيق: | الكتروني كتاب الكتروني |
| اللغة: | الإنجليزية |
| منشور في: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
|
| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
لا توجد وسوم, كن أول من يضع وسما على هذه التسجيلة!
|
جدول المحتويات:
- Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world.