Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
"This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international security or...
保存先:
| 第一著者: | |
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| 団体著者: | |
| フォーマット: | 電子媒体 eBook |
| 言語: | 英語 |
| 出版事項: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
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| 要約: | "This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international security order. Experts have long understood that leaders looking to secure allies face a critical tradeoff between strengthening their prospective ally to deter challenges to it while simultaneously refraining from making the ally too aggressive. The author explains how and when leaders can balance these tensions by building commitments that contain conditions and ambiguity"-- |
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| 物理的記述: | xiii, 207 p. : ill. |
| 書誌: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |