Organizational learning at NASA the Challenger and Columbia accidents /
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Kaituhi rangatōpū: | |
| Ētahi atu kaituhi: | |
| Hōputu: | Tāhiko īPukapuka |
| Reo: | Ingarihi |
| I whakaputaina: |
Washington, D.C. :
Georgetown University Press,
c2009.
|
| Rangatū: | Public management and change.
|
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Tāpirihia he Tūtohu
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
|
Rārangi ihirangi:
- Part I. Recognizing the value of organizational learning : Uncanny similarities: the Challenger and Columbia accidents
- Identifying organizational learning
- Part II. Analyzing the causes of the shuttle accidents : Structures for processing information
- Contractor relations
- Political and budgetary pressures
- Organizational culture
- Part III. Institutionalizing lessons about public organizational learning : The challenges of learning in public organizations
- Lessons from NASA about organizational learning.