The good in the right a theory of intuition and intrinsic value /
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Kaituhi rangatōpū: | |
| Hōputu: | Tāhiko īPukapuka |
| Reo: | Ingarihi |
| I whakaputaina: |
Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press,
c2004.
|
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
|
Rārangi ihirangi:
- 1. Early twentieth-century intuitionism
- Henry Sidgwick: three kinds of ethical intuitionism
- G.E. Moore as a philosophical intuitionist
- H.A. Prichard and the reassertion of dogmatic intuitionism
- C.D. Broad and the concept of fittingness
- W.D. Ross and the theory of prima facie duty
- Intuitions, intuitionism, and reflection
- 2. Rossian intuitionism as a contemporary ethical theory
- The Rossian appeal to self-evidence
- Two types of self-evidence
- Resources and varieties of moderate intuitionism
- Disagreement, incommensurability, and the charge of dogmatism
- Intuitive moral judgment and rational action
- 3. Kantian intuitionism
- The possibility of systematizing Rossian principles
- A Kantian integration of intuitionist principles
- Kantian intuitionism as a development of Kantian ethics
- Between the middle axioms and moral decision: the multiple grounds of obligation
- 4. Rightness and goodness
- Intrinsic value and the grounding of reasons for action
- Intrinsic value and prima facie duty
- The autonomy of ethics
- Deontological constraints and agent-relative reasons
- The unity problem for intuitionist ethics
- 5. Intuitionism in normative ethics
- Five methods in normative ethical reflection
- The need for middle theorems
- Some dimensions of beneficence
- Toward a comprehensive intuitionist ethics.