Veto Power : Institutional Design in the European Union /
Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiatin...
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Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έκδοση: |
Ann Arbor :
University of Michigan Press,
[2011]
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Σειρά: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
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Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full text available: |
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Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Institutional design at IGCs
- Case selection
- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism
- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism
- Winners and losers at Amsterdam
- Council votes and commissioners
- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration
- British accession : exit options and veto power.