The reflexive nature of consciousness
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Kaituhi rangatōpū: | |
| Hōputu: | Tāhiko īPukapuka |
| Reo: | Ingarihi |
| I whakaputaina: |
Amsterdam ; Philadelphia :
John Benjamins Pub. Co.,
c2008.
|
| Rangatū: | Advances in consciousness research ;
v. 72. |
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Tāpirihia he Tūtohu
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
|
Rārangi ihirangi:
- Introduction
- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character
- Some remarks on methodology
- Some semantics of "consciousness"
- Preamble
- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive
- State consciousness
- Unconscious mental states
- Self-consciousness
- Phenomenal consciousness
- A formula for state consciousness
- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula
- Putative counterexamples
- Non-conscious phenomenality?
- Summary
- Consciousness and self-awareness
- Preamble
- A gloss on intentionality
- The transitivity principle
- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle
- Higher-orderism
- Preamble
- The higher-order theory of consciousness
- A "one-state" alternative
- Preamble
- The Brentanian model
- Objections and replies
- Representationalism
- Preamble
- The representational theory of phenomenal character
- The nature of phenomenal character
- Preamble
- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness
- Some brief remarks on privacy
- Conclusion.