The reflexive nature of consciousness
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Prif Awdur: | |
|---|---|
| Awdur Corfforaethol: | |
| Fformat: | Electronig eLyfr |
| Iaith: | Saesneg |
| Cyhoeddwyd: |
Amsterdam ; Philadelphia :
John Benjamins Pub. Co.,
c2008.
|
| Cyfres: | Advances in consciousness research ;
v. 72. |
| Pynciau: | |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Tagiau: |
Ychwanegu Tag
Dim Tagiau, Byddwch y cyntaf i dagio'r cofnod hwn!
|
Tabl Cynhwysion:
- Introduction
- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character
- Some remarks on methodology
- Some semantics of "consciousness"
- Preamble
- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive
- State consciousness
- Unconscious mental states
- Self-consciousness
- Phenomenal consciousness
- A formula for state consciousness
- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula
- Putative counterexamples
- Non-conscious phenomenality?
- Summary
- Consciousness and self-awareness
- Preamble
- A gloss on intentionality
- The transitivity principle
- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle
- Higher-orderism
- Preamble
- The higher-order theory of consciousness
- A "one-state" alternative
- Preamble
- The Brentanian model
- Objections and replies
- Representationalism
- Preamble
- The representational theory of phenomenal character
- The nature of phenomenal character
- Preamble
- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness
- Some brief remarks on privacy
- Conclusion.