Commitment to Equity Handbook : Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty /

Commitment to Equity Handbook : Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty /

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"Examines methods for determining impact of taxation and public spending on inequality and poverty, both in theory and practice"--

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Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Lustig, Nora (Editor)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, [2018]
Series:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Subjects:
Poverty > Research.
Income distribution > Research.
Politique fiscale > Recherche > Guides, manuels, etc.
Revenu > Repartition > Recherche > Guides, manuels, etc.
Fiscal policy > Research > Handbooks, manuals, etc.
Poverty > Research > Handbooks, manuals, etc.
Income distribution > Research > Handbooks, manuals, etc.
Handbooks and manuals.
Electronic books.
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Table of Contents:
  • 1.About This Handbook / Nora Lustig
  • 2.Why Fiscal Incidence Analysis? / Nora Lustig
  • 3.The Commitment to Equity Assessment / Nora Lustig
  • 4.Main Messages / Nora Lustig
  • 5.Organization of the Handbook / Nora Lustig
  • 6.How to Use This Handbook / Nora Lustig
  • 7.CEQ Assessments: Data Requirements / Nora Lustig
  • 8.About the CEQ Institute / Nora Lustig
  • ch. 1 The CEQ Assessment: Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty / Nora Lustig
  • 1.The Theory of Fiscal Redistribution: Key Analytical Insights / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.The Fundamental Equation of the Redistributive Effect / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.2.Lambert's Conundrum / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.3.The Wildcard: Reranking of Households / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 2.Fiscal Incidence Analysis at a Glance / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 2.1.Allocating Taxes and Transfers to Individuals: The Art of Fiscal Incidence Analysis / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 2.2.Old-Age Social Insurance Contributory Pensions: A Government Transfer or Deferred Income? / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 2.3.Policy Simulations / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 2.4.Caveats: No Behavioral Responses, No Intertemporal Effects, and No Spillover Effects / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.CEQ Assessment: Indicators / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.Impact and Spending Effectiveness Indicators / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.1.Impact Effectiveness (IE) / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.2.Spending Effectiveness (SE) / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.2.Transfers: Indicators of Coverage, Errors of Exclusion, Errors of Inclusion, and Errors of Social Programs: Definitions / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • ch. 2 Analytic Foundations: Measuring the Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Transfers / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.The Fiscal System and Income Redistribution: The Case of a Single Tax or a Single Transfer / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.A Single Tax / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.1.Equalizing, Neutral, and Unequalizing Net Fiscal Systems: Conditions for the One-Tax Case / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.2.Comparing Two Taxes of Different Sizes / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 1.2.A Single Transfer / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 1.2.1.Fiscal Systems: Comparing Two Single-Transfer Systems of Different Sizes / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.The Fiscal System and Income Redistribution: Multiple Taxes and Transfers / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.1.Equalizing, Neutral, and Unequalizing Net Fiscal Systems / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.1.1.Conditions for the One Tax-One Transfer Case / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.1.2.Conditions for the Multiple Taxes and Transfers Case / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.2.Equalizing, Neutral, and Unequalizing Taxes or Transfers / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.2.1.Conditions for the One Tax-One Transfer Case / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.2.2.Conditions for the Multiple Taxes and Transfers Case / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.3.The Derivative of Marginal Contribution with Respect to Progressivity and Size / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.3.1.The Derivatives for the Case of a Marginal Change in Taxes / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.3.2.The Derivatives for the Case of a Marginal Change in Transfers / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.4.The Sensitivity of Marginal Contribution Analysis to the Use of the Conventional Gini Index / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • Appendix 2A. The Shapley Value / Ali Enami / Nora Lustig / Rodrigo Aranda
  • 1.Simple Shapley Value / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.Simple Shapley Value: ZID Approach / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 1.2.Simple Shapley Value: EID Approach / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.Hierarchy-Shapley Value / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.1.Hierarchy-Shapley Value: Nested Shapley / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 2.2.Hierarchy-Shapley Value: Owen Decomposition / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 3.Concluding Remarks / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • ch. 3 Measuring the Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Transfers in the Presence of Reranking / Ali Enami / Rodrigo Aranda / Nora Lustig
  • 1.Notations / Ali Enami
  • 1.1.Gini and Concentration Coefficients / Ali Enami
  • 1.2.Reynolds-Smolensky and Kakwani Indexes / Ali Enami
  • 1.3.The Relationship between the Redistributive Effect, Vertical Equity, and Reranking / Ali Enami
  • 1.4.Marginal Contribution / Ali Enami
  • 1.5.Vertical Equity / Ali Enami
  • 2.In the Presence of Reranking, Is the Marginal Contribution of a Tax Equalizing? / Ali Enami
  • 2.1.The Case of Only One Tax / Ali Enami
  • 2.2.The Case of Adding a Tax to a System That Has a Transfer in Place / Ali Enami
  • 2.3.The Case of Adding a Tax to a System with Multiple Taxes and Transfers in Place / Ali Enami
  • 3.In the Presence of Reranking, Is the Marginal Contribution of a Transfer Equalizing? / Ali Enami
  • 3.1.The Case of Only One Transfer / Ali Enami
  • 3.2.The Case of Adding a Transfer to a System That Has a Tax in Place / Ali Enami
  • 3.3.The Case of Adding a Transfer to a System with Multiple Taxes and Transfers in Place / Ali Enami
  • 4.Is the Total System More Equal? The Case of Adding a Tax and a Transfer / Ali Enami
  • 5.The Effect of a Marginal Change in One Tax or Transfer on the Equalizing (Unequalizing) Effect of a Whole System / Ali Enami
  • 5.1.The Case of a Marginal Change in a Tax / Ali Enami
  • 5.2.The Case of a Marginal Change in a Transfer / Ali Enami
  • 6.Lambert's Conundrum Revisited / Ali Enami
  • ch. 4 Can a Poverty-Reducing and Progressive Tax and Transfer System Hurt the Poor? (reproduced from Journal of Development Economics) / Ali Enami
  • Abstract / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 1.Introduction / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 2.The Problems with Conventional Measures / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 2.1.Poverty Measures / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 2.2.Horizontal Equity and Progressivity / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 2.3.Real-World Examples / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 3.Measures of Fiscal Impoverishment / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 3.1.Axioms / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 3.2.An Axiomatic Measure of Fiscal Impoverishment / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 3.3.Fiscal Impoverishment Dominance Criteria / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 4.Fiscal Gains of the Poor / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 4.1.An Axiomatic Measure of Fiscal Gains of the Poor / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 4.2.Decomposition of the Difference between Pre-Fisc and Post-Fisc Poverty / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 5.Illustration / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 5.1.Results for Seventeen Developing Countries / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 5.2.Results for a Range of Poverty Lines in Brazil / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • 6.Conclusions / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • Acknowledgments / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • Appendix 4A / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • A.1.FI Axioms / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • A.2.FGP Axioms / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • A.3.Proofs / Nora Lustig / Sean Higgins
  • ch. 5 Measuring the Effectiveness of Taxes and Transfers in Fighting Inequality and Poverty / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.Notation / Ali Enami
  • 2.New CEQ Effectiveness Indicators / Ali Enami
  • 2.1.Shortcomings of the 2013 Effectiveness Indicator / Ali Enami
  • 2.2.Impact and Spending Effectiveness Indicators / Ali Enami
  • 2.2.1.Impact Effectiveness / Ali Enami
  • 2.2.2.Spending Effectiveness / Ali Enami
  • 2.3.Fiscal Impoverishment and Gains Effectiveness Indicators / Ali Enami
  • 3.Conclusion / Ali Enami
  • ch. 6 Allocating Taxes and Transfers and Constructing Income Concepts: Completing Sections A, B, and C of the CEQ Master Workbook / Ali Enami
  • 1.The CEQ Master Workbook / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.The Microdata: Description of the Household Survey and Data Harmonization Assumptions / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.1.Definition of Household / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.2.Unit of Analysis / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.3.Missing or Zero Incomes / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.4.Top Coding / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.5.Outliers and Extreme Values / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.6.Under-Reporting and Top Incomes / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.7.Adult Equivalence and Economies of Scale / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.8.Spatial Price Adjustments / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.1.9.Expressing Values in Annual Terms / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 1.2.Data on Fiscal Systems / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 2.Income Concepts: Definitions / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.Constructing Income Concepts: The Art of Allocating Taxes and Transfers / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.Methods / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.1.Direct Identification / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.2.Inference / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.3.Imputation / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.4.Simulation / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.5.Prediction / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.6.Alternate Survey / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.1.7.Secondary Sources / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.2.Constructing Market Income and Market Income plus Pensions / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.2.1.Grossing Up / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.2.2.Negative Farm, Business, and Self-Employed Incomes / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.2.3.Imputed Rent for Owner-Occupied Housing / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.2.4.Value of Production for Own Consumption / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.3.Constructing Gross Income / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig
  • 3.4.Constructing Taxable Income / Sean Higgins / Nora Lustig

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