Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
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Main Author: | Crowe, Christopher |
---|---|
Corporate Author: | ebrary, Inc |
Format: | Electronic eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
Series: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/256. |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
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