Crisis and escalation in cyberspace /
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Santa Monica, CA :
RAND, Project Air Force,
2012.
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 0000178224 | ||
| 005 | 20171002064240.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr cn||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 121116s2012 caua ob 000 0 eng|d | ||
| 020 | |z 9780833076786 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ||
| 020 | |a 9780833076793 (e-book) | ||
| 035 | |a (CaPaEBR)ebr10818055 | ||
| 040 | |a CaPaEBR |b eng |e rda |e pn |c CaPaEBR | ||
| 043 | |a n-us--- | ||
| 050 | 1 | 4 | |a U163 |b .L518 2012eb |
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 358.4/141 |2 23 |
| 100 | 1 | |a Libicki, Martin C. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / |c Martin C. Libicki. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Santa Monica, CA : |b RAND, Project Air Force, |c 2012. | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (199 pages) : |b illustrations (some color) | ||
| 336 | |a text |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a "Prepared for the United States Air Force." | ||
| 500 | |a "Approved for public release; distribution unlimited." | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 163-172). | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses. | |
| 588 | |a Description based on print version record. | ||
| 590 | |a Electronic reproduction. Palo Alto, Calif. : ebrary, 2014. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries. | ||
| 610 | 1 | 0 | |a United States. |b Air Force |x Organization. |
| 610 | 1 | 0 | |a United States. |b Air Force |x Decision making. |
| 650 | 0 | |a Information warfare |z United States. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Escalation (Military science) | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Cyberspace |x Security measures. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Crisis management |x Government policy |z United States. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Cyberterrorism |x Prevention. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Conflict management. | |
| 655 | 0 | |a Electronic books. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Libicki, Martin C. |t Crisis and escalation in cyberspace. |d Santa Monica, CA : RAND, Project Air Force, 2012 |h xxvi, 172 pages ; 23 cm |z 9780833076786 |w (DLC) 2012046227 |
| 797 | 2 | |a ebrary. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://site.ebrary.com/lib/daystar/Doc?id=10818055 |z An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| 908 | |a 170314 | ||
| 942 | 0 | 0 | |c EB |
| 999 | |c 167362 |d 167362 | ||