Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court
محفوظ في:
| مؤلف مشترك: | |
|---|---|
| مؤلفون آخرون: | , , |
| التنسيق: | الكتروني كتاب الكتروني |
| اللغة: | الإنجليزية |
| منشور في: |
Charlottesville :
University of Virginia Press,
2006.
|
| سلاسل: | Constitutionalism and democracy
|
| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
لا توجد وسوم, كن أول من يضع وسما على هذه التسجيلة!
|
جدول المحتويات:
- Strategic games with Congress and the states
- Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin
- Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers
- Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn
- "John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg
- Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers
- Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy
- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan
- Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser
- Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson
- Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire
- Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum
- Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers.