The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda the role of bystanders /
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Kaituhi rangatōpū: | |
| Ētahi atu kaituhi: | |
| Hōputu: | Tāhiko īPukapuka |
| Reo: | Ingarihi |
| I whakaputaina: |
Leiden ; Boston :
Martinus Nijhoff,
c2007.
|
| Rangatū: | International and comparative criminal law series.
|
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
|
Rārangi ihirangi:
- Early warnings and early action by bystanders
- The tribunal's interpretation and implementation of the genocide convention
- Rwandan history
- Undermining UNAMIR
- The installment of UNAMIR with Belgian participation
- Early warning of atrocities in 1991-1994
- Early warnings from November to January
- The genocide fax and the prohibition from U.N. headquarters to act
- The negative response of New York and capitals in the west to the deteriorating situation
- Deteriorating security in Rwanda and the negative response from New York from January up until March
- Requests from Dallaire and from Belgium to New York for a stronger and firmer broadened mandate for UNAMIR
- UNAMIR : its mandate and the offending Belgian role
- The start of the genocide
- Evacuation
- Belgian decision to withdraw its troops
- The response of the Security Council
- The role of the Netherlands throughout the genocide
- Apologies from bystanders ten years later.