The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Kaituhi rangatōpū: | |
| Hōputu: | Tāhiko īPukapuka |
| Reo: | Ingarihi |
| I whakaputaina: |
Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press,
2004.
|
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Tāpirihia he Tūtohu
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
|
Rārangi ihirangi:
- Preface: A Test Case of Collective Security
- Introduction: The Nature of the Problem
- Pt. 1. Background of the Munich Crisis
- 1. The Shaky Foundations of Collective Security: Moscow, Paris, London
- 2. Soviet-Romanian Relations I: 1934-1938
- 3. Soviet-Romanian Relations II: Summer 1938
- Pt. 2. Foreground: Climax of the Crisis
- 4. East Awaiting West: Berchtesgaden to Godesberg
- 5. The Red Army Mobilizes
- 6. Denouement
- Pt. 3. Conclusion
- 7. What the Red Army Actually Did
- 8. What the Red Army Might Feasibly Have Done
- 9. Epilogue
- 10. Assessment of Soviet Intentions
- App. 1. Pertinent Paragraphs of the League of Nations Covenant
- App. 2. Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet Pacts: Excerpts.